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Introduction
The diffusion of new technologies is often supported by policies aimed at initiating or accelerating this process. The choice of the specific instrument and its design are crucial for its efficacy, i.e., the achieved rate of diffusion, as well as for its economic efficiency. In this paper, I analyze a policy instrument that offers different financial incentives for adopters depending on characteristics of the deployed technology. An example of such a policy instrument is the German feed-in tariff system for renewable energy technologies. Within this system, the owner of an eligible renewable installation receives a fixed price (feed-in rate) per kilowatt hour (kWh) electricity produced.
The marginal feed-in rate depends on technology characteristics of the individual installation.
Thus, this system is a form of differentiated or attribute-based regulation, which are widespread in practice. Spatially differentiated regulation (Tietenberg, 1978) and regulation differentiated by vintage of the respective technology (Gruenspecht, 1982; Nelson et al., 1993; Gray and Shadbegian, 2003; Stavins, 2006) have received the main attention in the economic literature on differentiated regulations so far. Recently, regulations depending on other characteristics or attributes of the underlying technology have also come under scrutiny (Ito and Sallee, 2014) . In the case of technology adoption, the impacts of differentiated regulation is mainly discussed with respect to vintage differentiated (Gruenspecht, 1982; Bushnell and Wolfram, 2012 ), yet not so much for other forms of attribute-based regulation.
The rapid growth of solar photovoltaic (PV) deployment in Germany in recent years underlines the positive correlation between investment incentives generated by feed-in tariffs and installed capacity. However, additional factors may also explain partly this development, such as cost reductions in solar panels, (regional) end-use prices for electricity or other subsidy schemes. The existence of multiple influencing factors calls for disentangling the effect of feed-in tariffs on the deployment of solar PV from other factors. The correlation between feed-in tariffs and installations for solar PV has been documented before (Leepa and Unfried, 2013; Grau, 2014) . The causal effect and especially its magnitude has not been identified yet. In this paper, I identify and estimate the causal effect of a cut in feed-in rates on the deployment of solar PV installations in Germany using data on all installations receiving feed-in tariffs from 2009 to 2013.
I separate the effect of feed-in tariffs from confounding factors using a differences-in-differences approach. Exogenous variation in feed-in tariffs stems from a policy change that includes a reevaluation of size classes within the feed-in tariff system. The marginal feed-in rate is mainly dependent on the size of the individual installation (conditional on technology and type). Thereby it is not a continuous function of size but varies across administratively determined size classes and remains constant within these intervals. This creates unsteadiness of the marginal feed-in rate function with jumps for installation sizes just at the border of size classes. The amendment of the Renewable Energy Act in 2012 (PV Amendment) included a re-evaluation of size classifications of PV installations. I make use of this policy change and the respective change in the unsteadiness of the marginal feed-in rate function as exogenous variation.
This work is in a line of papers in which the diffusion of solar PV installations and the impact of policy instruments is investigated. Hughes and Podolefsky (2015) and Burr (2014) show that upfront rebates in California are a major determinant of solar PV adoption. Leepa and Unfried (2013) estimate an error correction model that shows the influence of a feed-in tariff on a nationwide level. Grau (2014) develops a simulation model of PV deployment based on profitability (net present value) on a weekly basis. The focus of the latter two analyses lies on detecting correlations but those studies do not draw upon causal inference. Both analyses are also on the national level. Deployment can be very heterogeneous geographically due to different solar radiation values (Lamp, 2015) , social effects (among others, Gillingham and Bollinger, 2012; Rode and Weber, 2012; Gillingham and Graziano, 2015) and other socio-economic aspects. These factors cannot be captured in a nationwide analysis. Hence, my analysis is conducted on the county level to better account for additional influencing factors varying on a regional level which may be correlated with feed-in tariff adjustments.
I find that the average treatment effect amounts to around -46 in the period until the end of 2013. This means that for a five percent cut of the feed-in rate the newly installed capacity within one month in a county drops by around 46 kilowatt (kW). Annualized and aggregated on the national level, this is equivalent to a reduction of new installations of about 220 Megawatt (MW), which is about three percent of the average annual capacity additions from 2009 to 2011.
Further inspection of dynamic, i.e., time varying, treatment effects reveals that the effect persists until the end of 2013.
The re-evaluation of size classes includes de facto the introduction of attribute-based regulation for small installations. Thus, it provides an opportunity to identify the effect of attribute-based regulation on technology adoption. Before the amendment, installations up to 20 kW received the same marginal feed-in rate. Beyond the effect of a uniform reduction in feed-in rates across size classes, this specific design feature has also an additional impact on the distribution of installation sizes. The introduction of attribute-based regulation for small installations creates excess bunching at the upper border of the smaller size class. Neglecting this circumstance would lead to overestimating treatment effects by around double the size. This substantial difference underlines the impact of differentiated feed-in tariffs on technology adoption for solar PV. The design of the differentiated rates incentivizes smaller individual capacity choices at the border of the size classes to a capacity just at the ceiling of the smaller size class.
The paper is structured as follows: The institutional background and the identification strategy will be presented and discussed in Section 2. The data used in this analysis will be outlined in Section 3 and the empirical model will be specified in Section 4. Results of a naive differencesin-differences estimation, neglecting excess bunching, will be presented in Section 5. In Section 6, the issues with the naive approach will be addressed and treatment effects will be re-estimated. Section 7 concludes.
The PV Amendment 2012 and Identification Strategy
The feed-in tariff system specified in the Renewable Energy Act is the main (policy) instrument to foster the diffusion of renewable energy technologies in Germany. Eligible installations receive a fixed price (feed-in rate) for every kWh electricity produced. The rate of individual installations remains constant for 20 years beginning with the date of commissioning. Thereby the level of the feed-in rate is to be administratively determined, such that the rate shall on average enable an economic operation of renewable installations. Hence, feed-in rates are differentiated based on installation characteristics, taking into account e.g., differences across renewable technologies, plant types and installation sizes. In the case of solar PV, feed-in tariffs are distinguished mainly by size and type (ground, rooftop etc.) of the individual installation. For example, all rooftop installations within a certain size range (size class) receive the same marginal feed-in tariff at a given time. Those rates are in general regularly adjusted to reflect changes and developments over time. In the past, however, there have been also additional interventions from the government in order to react to unforeseen events, such as fast cost reductions for PV systems. Tariff adjustments do only apply to new installations. Existing installations receive their initial fixed rate, regardless of any changes after their commissioning.
Since its introduction in the year 2000, the Renewable Energy Act has been subject to several for my analysis is the re-evaluation of size classes that determine the marginal feed-in rates for newly build installations. 1 Given the more homogeneous technology and the higher probability to identify rooftop installations correctly, I concentrate on the change of size classes in the small installation segment. 2 Under the PV Amendment, the smallest size class for rooftop installations (up to 30 kW) was divided into two size classes (up to 10 kW and larger than 10 to 40 kW).
This change of size classes for small installations can serve as a quasi-experiment. Until the PV Amendment installations up to 30 kW received the same marginal feed-in rate. As depicted in Figure 1 the PV Amendment separates the marginal feed-in rates for installations from 0 to 10 kW and from larger than 10 to 30 kW. The larger size class experienced a deeper cut in the marginal feed-in rate compared to smaller units ranging from 0 to 10 kW. The difference is about five percent and can be used as a source of exogenous variation in feed-in rates. This larger cut is expected to change the relative deployment of installations within both size classes. Thus, the causal effect of a cut in marginal feed-in rates on PV capacity deployment can be identified by a differences-in-differences approach: the difference in deployment in the larger size class before the amendment and afterwards is compared to the deployment difference of smaller units.
Concerning the differences across installation sizes, the threshold value of 10 kW is fairly arbitrary chosen. IE Leipzig (2011) reports only small (cost) differences at the border of size classes. For example, size classes ranging up to 5 (or 15 kW) and larger than 5 to 35 kW (or 15 1 Other changes refer to more frequent adjustments of feed-in rates, a limit of 90 percent compensation for installations larger than 10 kW with the beginning of 2014, an overall 52 GW threshold from which on the feed-in system would be stopped and the requirement for all PV systems (existing and new ones) to be able to curtail production. I will comment on how these changes are important for my identification strategy below. 2 I do not explicitly observe in the data whether an installation is mounted on a rooftop. However, free-standing PV systems are usually not smaller than 100 kW. Thus, I am convinced that I mainly observe rooftop installations in the data set focusing only on small installations. The identification of the treatment effect, i.e., the deeper reduction of the feed-in rate, relies crucially on the comparability of installations across the two size classes. I restrict the analysis to small rooftop installations up to 20 kW to enhance comparability as I argue in the following. 3
Larger installations have smaller specific cost per unit capacity due to fixed cost degression.
However, figures provided by IE Leipzig (2011) and ZSW (2014) indicate that this difference is not very large. In addition to cost differences, the decision of the installation size is also dependent on the available space, i.e., the rooftop size. 4 Thus, the deployment of smaller and larger installations relies also on different building structures across regions, which can be regarded as fixed in the short-and medium-term. Time constant differences across regions do not hinder comparability and thus, do not interfere with the differences-in-differences approach. Furthermore, the average Data on regional end-user prices for electricity are provided by Ene't. The prices are aggregated from individual price offers by computing the average offer price for each county and month. I restrict the individual offer prices to make sure that only price offers for households are included before calculating the average. Furthermore, special rates (e.g., block pricing, for electric heating 3 I also estimated treatment effects with size classes up to 10 kW as control and larger than 10 to 30 kW as treatment group reaching similar conclusions. 4 Capacity is only a rough indicator for the space needed.
etc.) are excluded. One limitation of this data is the lack of the exact prices individuals actually pay. It only provides price offers. However, the data base includes a comprehensive list of price offers valid in the specific region at the respective time. Offer prices should therefore be correlated with the actual prices. Thus, it can be expected to contain regional and time variation of actual end-use electricity prices.
Summary statistics provided in Table 1 give an overview of the main variables used in this analysis. The development of monthly deployment of solar PV installations within both size classes on a national level is depicted in Figure 2 . The spikes in deployment are in the month before a downward adjustment of feed-in rates takes place as described by Leepa and Unfried (2013) and Grau (2014) . The aggregated new installations for both size categories in Germany develop quite similar, especially from mid year 2010 on until the treatment period starts. The start of the treatment period is depicted by the first (April 2012) and second vertical line (July 2012), respectively. The national figures would imply a divergence in capacity additions of both groups with start of the treatment, but it remains unclear whether this result may also be driven by other factors on a regionally more disaggregated level. Thus, the following analysis uses county level data to allow for more (regional) heterogeneity. 
Empirical Model
The estimation strategy builds on a differences-in-differences design by comparing the difference in the deployment in the size class with installations ranging from 10 to 20 kW and deployment changes in the smaller size class up to 10 kW before and after the PV Amendment in 2012. I include a fixed effect for the larger size class to capture time constant differences in deployment between the two size classes. Furthermore, month-year fixed effects account for time effects that are the same for all regions and installation sizes. This includes e.g. the regulatory environment from the federal government, general macroeconomic effects and technological progress in the solar PV industry. The latter is only true under the assumption that technological progress does not differ for installation sizes up to 20 kW. Evidence on this issue is provided by Benedetti (2014) with data for the Italian market. Especially module and inverter prices for different installation sizes experienced very similar developments in the recent past as given in Figure 3 . These figures can also be transferred to the German market since module and inverter prices are pegged to world market prices (IE Leipzig, 2011; ZSW, 2014) . County-year fixed effects control for differences across regions on an annual level. The fixed effects capture not only time constant regional differences, but also year-on-year changes. Thus, factors such as socio-economic characteristics like income and population will also be controlled for by the inclusion of county-year fixed effects. The various fixed effects control for all effects that remain constant over time, are the same for all counties or vary on a county level only with annual frequency. The analysis is further expanded to include one additional within year varying regional effect, i.e., regional end-use electricity prices. Changes in these prices often occur within a year 5 , are regionally differentiated and could also impact the decision to build a PV installation. Higher end-use electricity prices increase the incentive to self-consume electricity generated by the solar PV system. It can enhance the profitability of the installation, if the end-use price is larger than the respective feed-in rate.
The basic formulation of the empirical model is as follows:
where C i,m,y,r denotes the capacity additions in county i at month m in year y within size class r. r equals one for installations within the range of 10 to 20 kW indicating the larger size class.
µ i,y , µ r and µ m,y are county-year, size class and month-year fixed effects, respectively. D m,y,r is a binary variable that is equal to one for deployment within the larger size class after the start of the treatment period. β is the parameter of interest indicating the average treatment effect. X denotes the monthly average end-user offer price for electricity prices in the respective county.
The most important assumption for the differences-in-differences estimation is the common trends assumption (Angrist and Pischke, 2009 ). This assumption states that the treatment group (in this case the larger size class) and the control group (the smaller size class) would exhibit the same trend in capacity additions in absence of the treatment (cut in feed-in tariff). Different levels of capacity additions across both size classes are not relevant as long as they are time constant. In this case the size class fixed effect controls for these differences. The estimated effect can only be interpreted as the causal effect, if this assumption holds. Otherwise the differences in trends will also be captured by the treatment dummy biasing the estimated treatment effect. The common trends assumption, however, cannot be tested. The investigation of trends for both size classes before the treatment starts (pre-trends) may only give support to this assumption. If both groups do not exhibit the same trend in the periods before the treatment, the common trends assumption might be more difficult to rely on. Therefore, I compare the pre-trends of both groups. This is tested by including a linear trend interacted with a binary variable indicating the larger size class in a regression using only the observations before the PV Amendment. The class-specific time trend for the larger size class is found to be statistically insignificant, supporting both size classes exhibit the same trend in monthly capacity additions before the PV Amendment. 6 Related to the common trends assumption, another important assumption for the identification of the causal effect by a differences-in-differences estimation is random assignment into treatment and control group. Although there is a self-selection bias in the data, the policy design allows to estimate the magnitude of self-selection and to correct the bias to a certain degree. The next section presents naive estimation results neglecting self-selection. Comparing these results with the corrected estimates presented in Section 6 hints at the magnitude of the bias and illustrates the importance to take self-selection into consideration.
The design has potentially some further limits that need to be addressed to prevent biased estimates and to retain the causal interpretation. First, there is a clear pattern in the installation data that reveals anticipation effects of a change in the feed-in rates that have to be incorporated in the empirical model. This is illustrated by spikes of deployment in the month before tariff reduction in Figure 2 . It is captured by the time fixed effects since the feed-in rates are determined on the federal level. Differences across groups may result in self-selection, which I will deal with in Third, aside from adjustments of feed-in rates the PV Amendment introduces further differences between the two size classes. Installations that are commissioned later than March 2012 and that are larger than 10 kW will receive their feed-in rate for only 90 percent of the produced electricity from January 2014 on. This means that from this time on, 10 percent of the electricity production has to be either sold privately or self-consumed. This should not provide a massive disadvantage for larger installations, given that households can easily achieve self-consumption rates up to 30 percent. Especially, I observe that from April 2012 on average end-use electricity prices are in all regions larger than the feed-in rates for installations up to 10 kW (and thus, also for installations up to 20 kW). Thus, self-consumption is profitable and superior to receive feed-in rates for the whole amount of produced electricity. I explicitly account for differences in the profitability of selfconsumption across regions and time by including these time-varying regional end-use electricity prices.
Fourth, solar PV installations may receive subsidies additional to feed-in tariffs. Other subsidy programs for solar PV could potentially interfere with the presented design. Important for the validity of this design are only differences in subsidies across size classes and whether those change for pre-and post-treatment period. If subsidies within a program are provided regardless of the size of the installation or remains unchanged over the observation period, the differences-in-differences design might remain valid. 7 I check whether there are subsidy programs from local utilities, federal state governments or agencies using a database from BINE (2015) . This check reveals that there do not exist programs that either differentiate across size classes or do not change this differentiation around the time of the PV Amendment. In the latter case, those subsidies may interact with the treatment and may make self-selection more attractive. Furthermore, I cannot rule out that there a more special promotion offers by local actors on a deeper local level, which are not listed in this database. However, promotion offers existing on a lower regional level than counties will be averaged and may lose its importance in this analysis.
Results of the 'Naive' Approach
The estimated constant treatment effects are shown in Table 3 . 8 In each specification the monthly capacity additions in a county within one of the two size classes are regressed on a binary 7 The propensity to actually take up these subsidies could potentially be increasing in installation size. The time constant part of this possible higher propensity in the larger size class is captured by the fixed effects for the larger size class. 8 The full estimation results can be found in Appendix A. Table 3 ).
Treatment effects are statistically significant at the one percent level in all four specifications. This means that the monthly capacity of new installations within a county decreases by 84 kW (April) or 91 kW (July), respectively. The range of almost seven kW (or around eight percent of the decrease) underlines the potential importance of the protection clause. From April to June 2012 the treatment group covers potentially also installations without treatment. Hence, the treatment effect starting in April 2012 is expected to be smaller in absolute terms than for the treatment starting in July 2012, which is also revealed by the empirical analyses. Furthermore, I include a class-specific linear time trend for larger installations as a robustness check. However, this leads only to small changes in treatment effects, with the class-specific trend being insignificant in both cases. In addition to the estimation of the average treatment effect over the treatment period, I also 
Self-selection and Excess Bunching
The differences-in-differences analysis relies crucially on common trends of treatment and control group. This assumption is likely to be violated if self-selection into treatment or control group is possible. In the case of solar PV, investors can choose the size of their installation and thus, can theoretically self-select into treatment or control group. Marginal feed-in rates are one (however an important) factor in determining the optimal installation size. Cost differences across installation sizes, different rooftop capacities or financing constraints represent other important determinants.
A major impact of the introduction of different marginal feed-in rates for small installations can be expected at the border of the size classes. Threshold values at the boundaries of size classes create jumps in the marginal feed-in rate function. This implies an unsteady function that is unlikely to represent exactly the differences across installation sizes, especially for small changes of installation sizes around the threshold values. This may offer one explanation for the excess bunching at the ceiling of the lower size class that can be observed in the data after the introduction of attributebased regulation. The intuition of this can be explained using Figure 5 , in which an upward sloping optimal capacity choice function dependent on the marginal feed-in rates and the valid marginal feed-in tariff rates are depicted. 10 This figure can be used to illustrate an exemplary individual static adoption decision for a specific point in time. 11 Before the PV Amendment, all installations up to 20 kW receive the same marginal feed-in rate. In this example, the individual with this specific capacity choice curve would optimally install the related capacity at point A. However, with the respective feed-in tariff after the PV Amendment, the capacity choice in point A is not optimal any longer because now only point B can be achieved. The individual optimizes utility at point C, respectively point C', which is directly at the upper bound of the smaller installation category. This effect can lead to excess bunching of installations at a capacity of 10 kW. 10 The capacity choice function is conditioned on other factors, such as rooftop or financing constraints, and is assumed to be linear only for illustrative reasons. The result holds for any other monotonically non-decreasing function. 11 A static adoption decision is assumed for reasons of simplicity. The actual decision to adopt or not adopt in a given period may rather be a dynamic problem. However, in this case only the choice of the installation size is to be illustrated. This could be seen as the second stage after the decision to adopt a solar PV system is made.
First, in histograms of individual new PV installations excess bunching is revealed. In Figure 6 the distribution of sizes of new installations within 1 kW bins up to 20 kW within one year (from July to December) is compared to the distribution of sizes of new installations in the previous year (from July to December). 12 Before the PV Amendment, the distribution appears to be rather stable across years. After the change in size classes in 2012 a spike at the 10 kW bin is striking.
New installations bunch exactly at the capacity threshold for the lower marginal feed-in rate.
The 
where C i,m,y,k is the installed capacity in bin k in county i at time t and w k are parameters for a set of binary variables indicating the 20 different one kW bins. µ i and µ m,y are county and month-year fixed effects, respectively. The parameter estimates w k are used to construct weights of the different bins (( w k − min( w k ))/( 20 k=1 w k − min( w k )) as shown in Figure 7 . 14 99 percent confidence intervals for these point estimates are constructed by a wild bootstrap with 999 replications. The estimated weights for the bins exhibit a spike at 10 kW from April 2012 on and show smaller weights for bins larger than 10 kW compared to before. However, differences for bin weights before and after the PV Amendment are statistically significant only for the bins at two and seven kW as well as from 10 to 16 kW, with the largest differences being observed from 11 to 14 kW. The statistical analysis seems to support the hypothesis derived from visual inspection, i.e., bunching at 10 kW seems to occur from the right. In particular, this suggest that some of the 10 kW installations would have been most likely build larger (mainly up to 14 kW) in absence of the size class re-evaluation. If this selection is neglected, it will be implicitly assigned to the negative deployment effect of a cut in feed-in tariffs. The resulting (absolute) treatment effects are then likely to be overestimated.
To reconcile this problem, I would ideally need the distribution of capacity additions that would have occurred without the re-evaluation of size classes. Since this is unobservable, I estimate a counterfactual distribution using a bunching approach as in Chetty et al. (2011) . The identifying assumption for inference is that the capacity distribution from 1 to 20 kW would have been smooth without the re-evaluation of size classes. As shown in Figure 6 the distribution remains rather stable across years before the change of size classes. The number and location of bins with insignificant differences in their estimated weights depicted in Figure 7 strengthen further the credibility of this assumption. 15 The following procedure is based on Chetty et al. (2011) , who estimate the counterfactual distribution by fitting a polynomial up to a power of q and including a binary variable to control for excess bunching. I estimate the following equation by ordinary least squares (OLS):
where S m,y,k is the share of newly installed capacity within bin k in total capacity additions in month m and year y. 16 bin k is the respective bin of the installed capacity. D 10 is a binary variable that is equal to one for the 10 kW bin after the enactment of the PV Amendment. µ m,y are month-year fixed effects.
Following Chetty et al. (2011) , I define the excess bunching at the 10 kW bin ( B m,y ) as the difference between the observed capacity share (S m,y,10 ) and the counterfactual capacity share ( S m,y,10 − γ D 10 ). However, the simple deduction of γ D 10 would not yield the same space under the counterfactual distribution as under the original distribution (Chetty et al., 2011) . Thus, the dependent variable is adjusted in an iterative manner such that the fitted values fulfill the "integration constraint". In this case the sum of fitted values must be equal to one in each period.
Therefore, the capacity shares in bins larger than 10 kW are scaled by the amount of excess bunching relative to the overall capacity share of the larger size class in the respective period.
This assumes that the distribution is shifted from the right, which is supported by the preceding statistical analysis of weights.
This procedure differs to Chetty et al. (2011) to some extent taking into account the characteristics of the underlying data. Given the discrete nature of PV installations and that investors can (almost) perfectly control installation size, excess bunching appears rather to be a point mass (in contrast to the case of income as in Saez (2010) and Chetty et al. (2011) ). In the empirical setting, bins with the size of one kW yield the best fit. To enhance precision in estimating the counterfactual distribution, I exploit time and cross-sectional variation.
The sample of county-month-size class observations is adjusted for excess bunching as follows.
The capacity of all bins before the change of size classes remain unchanged. After the PV Amendment monthly capacity additions within bins larger or equal to 10 kW are adjusted. For the 10 kW bin the excess mass has to be deducted and for the larger than 10 kW bins this excess mass will be added. The estimate of the excess mass at the 10 kW bin is the difference of actual and estimated capacity in this bin in this period. 17 The latter is calculated by multiplying the total capacity additions within a month and county by the respective fitted value from Equation 4 subtracted by γ D 10 . The estimated excess mass at 10 kW is then equally distributed on the installation bins larger than 10 kW. 18 This procedure leads to the excess bunching adjusted distribution of installation sizes as shown in Figure 8 .
17 Only positive excess mass will be considered since I want only identify excess bunching. If the difference between observed and estimated capacity in the respective county and time period is smaller than zero, the capacity will remain unchanged. Thus, this procedure leads to a lower bound of treatment effects. 18 Note that it does not matter whether the excess mass is equally distributed or with any other weights because in the empirical analysis the comparison is based on more aggregate groups, i.e., up to 10 kW and larger than 10 up to 20 kW. Hence, the distribution within a size class does not impact the estimated treatment effects. The aggregate deployment is shown in Figure 9 . Compared to the actual values observed in the data in Figure 2 , adjusting for excess bunching leads to a smaller gap between the two size classes with beginning of the treatment period. The pre-treatment deployment development remains the same. 19 The direction of this change, i.e., a smaller gap, is not surprising considering the construction of the adjusted sample. Only the magnitude is illustrative in this figure and hints already at a rather large impact of excess bunching on the gap after the PV Amendment and thus on treatment effects. Given the adjusted sample at hand, I re-estimate the empirical model outlined in Section 5.
The estimated constant treatment effects are statistically significant, but considerably smaller, i.e.
approximately half the size, compared to the treatment effects without taking excess bunching into account. The constant treatment effect starting in July is around -0.46. 20 This means that a five percent cut in feed-in tariffs leads on average to a reduction of monthly new installed capacity in a county of 46 kW. Thus, the smaller gap on the aggregate level in Figure 9 is mirrored by estimation results on the county level. 
Conclusion
In this paper I explore the impact of one specific influencing factor for the deployment of (residential) solar PV systems. Feed-in tariffs are a widely used policy instrument to support the diffusion of renewable energy technologies by means of a production subsidy. Renewable energy and other environmental or so-called green technologies are to reduce (negative) environmental impacts.
It is considered as an option to combat climate change by mitigating greenhouse gas emissions in electricity generation. Therefore, understanding the diffusion process of those technologies is key to tailor future and improve current (environmental) policies.
Using quasi-experimental variation, I identify the causal effect of feed-in rates on solar PV deployment in Germany. I disentangle this effect from other influencing factors by a differencesin-differences approach using data for all PV installations receiving feed-in tariffs within Germany 
